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Abstract 
This paper provides new evidence on the male female wage gap in academia. Using unique data from the economics 
discipline, we estimate a human-capital based model to explore the nature of wage differentials among male and 
female economics professors. Results indicate the salary gap varies across systematically across individual and 
institutional characteristics.
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1. Introduction 
 
The realm of academe is generally considered a progressive and enlightened environment but 
even in this bastion of progressiveness, charges of sex discrimination sometimes arise.  For example, 
in 1999, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) faced a widely reported complaint of sex 
discrimination from female professors.  An internal examination of the data supported the contention 
that an unequal playing field had resulted in women receiving relatively lower salaries, awards and 
resources.  Robert J. Birgeneau, Dean of the School of Science, stated that "correcting this extreme 
imbalance is one of the major challenges that MIT faces as we enter the next millennium" 
(Birgeneau, 1999).  Data provided by the American Association of University Professors (AAUP), 
suggest such male-female differentials are common throughout academe and do not appear to be 
narrowing.1 
 Academic researchers, of course, have weighed in on this issue.  The literature provides 
considerable empirical evidence of a significant male-female salary gap in academia, but findings 
also reveal that there is substantial variation in the salary gap across disciplines (Ginther and Hayes, 
2003.  Economics is reported to have an especially large disparity in salaries and promotion rates 
between men and women professors across all ranks (Ginther and Kahn, 2004).2  
 While research generally indicates a salary gap exists, the literature does not provide a 
consensus on the underlying causes.  Some studies contend that wage differentials between male and 
female professors arise from differences in salary negotiating behavior (Babcock and Laschever, 
2003), competitive desire (Kanazawa, 2005) and social networks (McDowell et al., 2006).  Others 
suggest the wage disparities arise from sex-specific lifecycle factors, such as child rearing and post 
doctoral training (Johnson and Stafford, 1974), and differences in the age of graduation and initial 
appointment (Ferber and Kordick, 1978).  And much work has indicated that wage disparities may 
result largely from discrimination within the promotion and tenure processes (Ginther and Hayes, 
2003).  This paper employs a unique set of data to provide new set of insights to this issue while 
providing a benchmark for current and future work.  
 
2. The Data 
 
The data used for estimating and comparing academic salaries are unique and were compiled 
from a survey of academic economists (conducted between 1991 and 1993) who are listed in the 
1989 American Economic Association membership volume.  Though not recent, the uniqueness of 
the data provides opportunities for insights and benchmarks for the literature.  All listed women 
were surveyed, and the sample of men included every tenth person that was male and working at an 
academic institution.  If the tenth person was either not male or not in academia, the next 
encountered male academic was surveyed.  Selecting men and women for the survey according to 
their names is obviously imperfect, but a relatively high level of accuracy was maintained by having 
respondents verify initial impressions by indicating their sex on returned surveys.  Of the 
                         
1 Blau and Kahn (2004) find the primary factor leading to the slowdown of convergence of male and female wages 
nationwide is the ‘unexplained gap’ which includes changes in labor market discrimination.  Results from Blau and 
Kahn (2000) imply the slowdown of convergence in the academic salary gap is partially due to the general increases 
in salary inequality within academia. 
2 For example, Ginther and Kahn (2004) reports a 21.6 percent male female pay gap in economics (12.6 percent 
unexplained) and a 11.5 percent gap in political science (-2.4 percent unexplained), while Ginther and Hayes (2003) 
find no significant pay gap among professors in the humanities. 
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approximately 2600 forms mailed, 1251 usable ones (844 men and 407 women) were returned, a 
response rate of about 48 percent. 
 Table I provides a listing and brief description of the variables used for the regressions to 
follow.  Annual academic salary, converted to log values, is the dependent variable.  Table II reports 
the descriptive statistics for salaries by rank and institution type.  A comparison of the aggregate 
numbers from our survey and those provided by the AEA’s survey provides confidence in the 
reasonableness of our data.3  Note that salaries from our survey have been adjusted to 2000 dollars, 
using the consumer price index.  Independent variables used in regressions which might affect salary  
 
 
Table I. Definitions of Variables  
Variable Definition 
lnSalary the log of annual academic earnings for respondent 
Productivity Measures  
     Articles1 the number of articles published1
     Articles Squared the number of articles published squared 
     Top Articles2 the percentage of articles published in the top 24 journals2 
     Books the number of books published 
     Courses the number of courses taught each year 
     Experience the number of years employed in academia 
     Experience Squared the number of years employed in academia squared 
     Awards dummy variable indicating if respondent has received an award for teaching, 
research or service; 1=yes, 0=otherwise 
Institution Attributes  
     AACSB3 dummy variable indicating if institution is AACSB accredited; 1=yes, 
0=otherwise 
     Business dummy variable indicating if department resided in a college or school of 
business; 1=yes, 0=otherwise 
     Public dummy variable indicating if institution is public; 1=yes, 0=otherwise 
     Union dummy variable indicating if respondent indicates institution to be unionized; 
1=yes, 0=otherwise 
     Teaching dummy variable indicating if respondent considers institution to be teaching 
oriented; 1=yes, 0=otherwise 
Individual Attributes  
     Sex dummy variable indicating if respondent is male; 1=yes, 0=otherwise 
     Race dummy variable indicating if respondent is nonwhite; 1=yes, 0=otherwise 
     Move dummy variable indicating if respondent has changed jobs at least once; 1=yes, 
0=otherwise 
1published articles are discounted ½ for co-authored papers and ½ for notes 
2as determined by Graves et al. (1982); see footnote 5 for the list of journals 
3AACSB refers to the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business, which is the leading business school 
accreditation agency. 
 
 
 
                         
3 For comparison purposes, we assume that AEA Ph.D. Granting Schools are roughly comparable to the Carnegie 
Foundation’s Research and Doctoral classification, Master’s Degree Granting is similar to Carnegie’s 
Comprehensive category, and Bachelor’s Degree Granting corresponds to Carnegie’s Liberal Arts classification 
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Table II. Range of Academic Salaries by Rank and Institution Type 
 Professor Associate Assistant 
Research    
     Mean 74,937 52,888 43,988 
     Std Dev 14,521 6,856 7,108 
     AEA Mean 72,770 51,957 41,781 
Comprehensive    
     Mean 56,463 45,841 38,258 
     Std Dev 8,164 5,013 4,340 
     AEA Mean 57,966 47,767 41,094 
Liberal Arts    
     Mean 53,604 42,249 37,888 
     Std Dev 7,407 4,974 4,122 
     AEA Mean 54,504 42,788 34,499 
  
 
levels are experience, research productivity, as measured by books and articles produced, teaching 
load, and certain attributes of the department and institution where respondents were employed.  (see 
Ginther and Hayes (2003), among others, for more details of the well-documented variable set).4 
 
3. The Model and Decomposition Procedures 
 
In order to compare the earnings of men and women academic economists, we conditionally 
estimate salaries for each group.  Any observed earnings differentials are then decomposed into three 
parts: that part which is due to differences in means; that part which is due to differences in response 
rates; and a residual which, since other influences have been accounted for, has generally been 
viewed as evidence of possible direct sex based discrimination.5  Decomposition procedures were 
developed in sociology by Althauser and Wigler (1972) and in economics by Oaxaca (1973), and 
Blinder (1973), and extended by Neumark (1988). 
 The Oaxaca-Blinder procedure determines and analyzes earnings differentials by using the 
parameter estimates from either the male equation or the female equation as the benchmark, which is 
akin to a choice between placing women in a man’s world or men in woman’s world.  Results will 
therefore indicate different residuals depending on which estimates are used as the benchmark.  The 
Neumark procedure eliminates this issue by using estimates that are averages of the male and female 
regression coefficients, weighted according to the proportions of men and women in the relevant 
population.  This method attempts to incorporate that, if male-favoring discrimination does exist and 
is eliminated, men’s earnings will fall while those of women will rise.  Marginal products and 
salaries will, ceteris paribus, tend to equalize.  For this study, estimates using the Oaxaca-Blinder 
method are omitted and only the results obtained from the Neumark procedure are reported.6 
                         
4 Regarding data specification, we use the 13 year mark to define relatively less and more experienced economists to 
yield a reasonable balance of observations in each category.  Results were not sensitive to marginal changes to this 
definition.  We did not include academic rank as an explanatory variable because it is highly correlated with years of 
experience and the productivity measures. 
5 As others have pointed out, uneven workplace conditions and labor market adjustments may disguise 
discriminatory practices and unexplained residuals may result from freely made but unidentified choices (e.g., 
Darity, 1980).  
6 Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions can be made available when requested. 
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 The estimated equations are derived from the following behavioral model: 
 
 iijjj0i +X+=Y       (1) 
 
where Yi is the mean salary of the academic economists in the relevant population, Xj is the 
corresponding vector of independent variables, and i is the stochastic error term.  Average salary 
estimates for men and women are obtained separately using the ordinary least-squares technique: 
 
lnȲm = BjX̄jm       (2) 
lnȲf = BjX̄jf       (3) 
 
where Bj are parameter estimates and X̄j
m and X̄j
f are sample means of the independent variables from 
the survey data.  Decomposition of the sex-specific total earnings differential is accomplished 
according to: 
 
           lnȲm -
 lnȲf  =  Bj*(X̄jm -X̄jf)+X̄jm (Bmj-Bj*)+X̄jf (Bj*-Bfj).     (4) 
 
B*is the vector of parameter estimates which is the weighted average (by sub-population sizes) of 
male and female regression coefficients from equations 2 and 3. The first term on the right side of 
equation (4) is the familiar adjustment for differences in productivity and other choice-related 
factors.  The second and third terms constitute the unexplained residual earnings difference between 
men and women.  The second term measures the amount by which current marginal productivity for 
men differs from that which would occur in a discrimination-free condition and the third term 
measures the amount by which marginal productivities of women differ from the discrimination free 
condition. 
 
4. Regression Results 
 
Tables III and IV present the estimated coefficients and p-values for five models: pooled, less 
experience, more experience, research and comprehensive.  Each model performs well and explains 
much of the total variation (44 to 59 percent) in salaries.  Parameter estimates indicate the 
independent measures, especially those related to experience and productivity, have substantial 
explanatory power with respect to salary levels—a result that is consistent with theory.  Estimates 
across all models indicate the number of published articles and the proportion of articles in high 
level journals (top articles) generally have significant positive effects on salary levels for men and 
women.7  The number of published books has a significant positive effect on men’s salaries in all 
cases except the comprehensive and less experience models, and on women’s salaries in all cases 
except the pooled, experience and comprehensive models.  The negative estimated coefficients for 
articles squared indicate diminishing returns from publishing, while estimates show the number of 
courses taught is negatively related to salary levels for men and women in all models.   
 
  
                         
7 Note that data stratification will thin the sample and consequently diminish the robustness of the estimates, 
particularly when estimating female models with limited female observations.   
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Table III. Wage Equation Estimates for Pooled and Experience Models 
 Pooled Less Experience More Experience
Variable Male Female  Male Female  Male Female 
Articles 0.0129‡ 0.0138‡ 0.0179‡ 0.0148‡ 0.0118‡ 0.0148‡
 (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0014)  (0.0000) (0.0009) 
Articles2 -8-05‡ -1-04‡  -2-04‡ -2-04‡  -7-05‡ -1-04† 
 (0.0000) (0.0031)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0163) 
Top Articles 0.0024‡ 0.0014‡  0.0011† 0.0016‡  0.0043‡ -5-04 
 (0.0000) (0.0007)  (0.0115) (0.0002)  (0.0000) (0.5340) 
Books 0.0117‡ 0.0128†  0.0153 0.0089  0.0117‡ 0.0114* 
 (0.0008) (0.0119)  (0.2133) (0.4869)  (0.0015) (0.0627) 
Courses -0.023‡ -0.022‡  -0.015‡ -0.018‡  -0.030‡ -0.039‡ 
 (0.0000)) (0.0001)  (0.0077) (0.0044)  (0.0000) (0.0009) 
Experience 0.0244‡ 0.0156‡  0.0172 0.0238‡  0.0326‡ 0.0038 
 (0.0000)) (0.0002)  (0.3417) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.7828) 
Experience2 -4-04‡ -2-04  -4-04 -0.001  -5-04‡ -2-05 
 (0.0000) (0.1500)  (0.7604) (0.3714)  (0.0003) (0.9447) 
Awards 0.0872‡ 0.1286‡  0.1428‡ 0.1913‡  0.0301 0.0016 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.2093) (0.9675) 
AACSB 0.0336† 0.0365†  0.0378* 0.0262  0.0422† 0.0802† 
 (0.0182) (0.0464)  (0.0718) (0.2430)  (0.0254) (0.0136) 
Business 0.0992‡ 0.0441*  0.1277‡ 0.0439  0.0688‡ 0.0186 
 (0.0000) (0.0574)  (0.0000) (0.1158)  (0.0021) (0.1310) 
Public -0.054‡ -0.028  -0.026 -0.029‡  -0.081‡ -0.031 
 (0.0002) (0.1301)  (0.2069) (0.0044)  (0.0001) (0.3455) 
Union 0.0087 0.0047  -0.029 0.0072‡  0.0314 0.0085 
 (0.9389) (0.8376)  (0.9637) (0.8275)  (0.3138) (0.8758) 
Teaching -0.098‡ -0.093‡  -0.090‡ -0.106‡  -0.091‡ -0.048 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0003) (0.0000)  (0.0001) (0.2495) 
Race -0.004 0.0253  0.0021 0.0221†  -0.001 0.0501 
 (0.8535) (0.5085)  (0.8062) (0.5597)  (0.7305) (0.4955) 
Move -0.004 0.0341*  0.0096 0.0571†  -0.009 -0.007 
 (0.8029) (0.0781)  (0.9768) (0.0126)  (0.6283) (0.8470) 
Constant 10.57‡ 10.59‡  10.57‡ 10.58‡  10.89‡ 10.60‡ 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) 
     F 81.58 34.64  33.31 18.48  44.68 10.01 
     R2 0.589 0.554  0.441 0.428  0.571 0.469 
     N 844 407  351 253  493 154 
Note: p-values are reported in parentheses, and ‡, † and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. 
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Table IV. Wage Equation Estimates for Pooled and Institution Models 
 Pooled Research Comprehensive 
Variable Male Female  Male Female  Male Female 
Articles 0.0129‡ 0.0138‡ 0.0135‡ 0.0101† 0.0124‡ 0.0238‡
 (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0299)  (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Articles2 -8-05‡ -1-04‡  -8-05‡ -4-05  -1-04‡ -2-04‡ 
 (0.0000) (0.0031)  (0.0000) (0.7327)  (0.0000) (0.0001) 
Top Articles 0.0024‡ 0.0014‡  0.0027‡ 0.0013†  0.0013† 0.0008 
 (0.0000) (0.0007)  (0.0000) (0.0154)  (0.0123) (0.1878) 
Books 0.0117‡ 0.0128†  0.0017‡ 0.0138†  0.0095 0.0024 
 (0.0008) (0.0119)  (0.0047) (0.0227)  (0.2702) (0.8743) 
Courses -0.023‡ -0.022‡  -0.023‡ -0.014*  -0.024‡ -0.035‡ 
 (0.0000)) (0.0001)  (0.0002) (0.0934)  (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Experience 0.0244‡ 0.0156‡  0.0297‡ 0.0144†  0.0135‡ 0.0222‡ 
 (0.0000)) (0.0002)  (0.0000) (0.0154)  (0.0013) (0.0008) 
Experience2 -4-04‡ -2-04  -5-04‡ -2-04  -7-05 -3-04 
 (0.0000) (0.1500)  (0.0000) (0.3283)  (0.5188) (0.1214) 
Awards 0.0872‡ 0.1286‡  0.0741‡ 0.1454‡  0.0965‡ 0.0956‡ 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0016) (0.0000)  (0.0001) (0.0020) 
AACSB 0.0336† 0.0365†  0.0404† 0.0457*  0.0202 0.0383 
 (0.0182) (0.0464)  (0.0382) (0.0880)  (0.2928) (0.1016) 
Business 0.0992‡ 0.0441*  0.0997‡ 0.1171‡  0.0797‡ -0.045 
 (0.0000) (0.0574)  (0.0000) (0.0011)  (0.0004) (0.1074) 
Public -0.054‡ -0.028  -0.091‡ -0.077‡  0.0282 0.0257 
 (0.0002) (0.1301)  (0.0000) (0.0034)  (0.1645) (0.3438) 
Union 0.0087 0.0047  -0.006 -0.065  -0.0179 0.0671† 
 (0.9389) (0.8376)  (0.8563) (0.1461)  (0.5145) (0.0488) 
Teaching -0.098‡ -0.093‡  -0.080‡ -0.080†  -0.080‡ 0.0028 
 (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0020) (0.0153)  (0.0064) (0.9356) 
Race -0.004 0.0253  -0.026 0.0557  0.0173 -0.009 
 (0.8535) (0.5085)  (0.4556) (0.3182)  (0.4958) (0.7942) 
Move -0.004 0.0341*  -0.015 0.0781‡  0.0317 -0.035 
 (0.8029) (0.0781)  (0.4541) (0.0057)  (0.1306) (0.1552) 
Constant 10.57‡ 10.59‡  10.60‡ 10.64‡  10.58‡ 10.59‡ 
 (0.0000)) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) 
     F 81.58‡ 34.64  45.69‡ 16.22‡  21.16‡ 18.53‡ 
     R2 0.589 0.554  0.578 0.528  0.462 0.567 
     N 844 407  490 205  354 202 
Note: p-values are reported in parentheses, and ‡, † and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels. 
 
7 
 
Additional years of experience significantly increase salaries for men and to a lesser extent women, 
and estimates of experience squared suggest that only men appear to face a diminishing return from 
experience. 
 Estimates related to institutional attributes indicate that economists generally receive 
significantly greater compensation when affiliated with an AACSB accredited college of business.  
Whether an institution is public or private does not matter for salaries at comprehensive universities, 
but salaries at research institutions are significantly higher at private universities than public.  
Results also suggest salaries at unionized institutions (union) are not significantly different than 
those at non-unionized institutions, though the single significant effect (positive) for women at 
comprehensive institutions is an important exception.  
 We now turn to the decomposition of the estimated earnings to examine male-female wage 
differentials for academic economists.  Table V summarizes salary information on men and women 
and provides details on the differences.  For the pooled equations, men appear to earn about 15 
percent ($7671) more than women.  When the data are stratified, the gap narrows to 8 percent 
($3774) for those with less than 13 years of experience but widens to 22 percent ($12123) for those 
in research-doctoral schools.  The results suggest that differences in human capital and other 
identified factors explain 80 percent of the differential for the pooled data, leaving an unexplained 
gap of about 20 percent.  Stratified results reveal that 17 percent ($740) of the wage differential is 
unexplained at comprehensive institutions while 39 percent ($4715) is unexplained at research 
institutions.  Among less and more experienced academic economists 21 percent ($805) and 54 
percent ($3822) of the wage gap is left unexplained.8  The decompositions suggest that, for less 
experienced academics and for those working at comprehensive or liberal arts institutions, sex 
discrimination may not substantially affect salaries—the unexplained differential is about 1 percent 
of salaries.  For those working in research-doctoral schools, and particularly those with more 
experience, the unexplained differentials are four to six times larger and sex discrimination may be 
of greater concern. 
 
 
Table V. Analysis of Male-Female Salary Differentials by Category 
    Male Female Difference   Skill Residual 
Pooled  10.9203  10.7250  0.1478  0.1179  (80%)  0.0299  (20%) 
 ($55,389) ($48,169) ($7,671) ($6,118) ($1,553) 
Less Experience  10.7789  10.6971  0.0819  0.0644  (79%)  0.0175  (21%) 
 ($48,000) ($44,226) ($3,774) ($2,968)  ($805) 
More Experience  11.0378  10.9178  0.1200  0.0548  (46%)  0.0652  (54%) 
 ($62,182) ($55,149) ($7,033) ($3,210) ($3,822) 
Research  11.0102  10.7865  0.2236  0.1369  (61%)  0.0867  (39%) 
 ($60,485) ($48,362) ($12,123) ($7,408) ($4,715) 
Comprehensive  10.7835  10.6872  0.0963  0.0805  (83%)  0.0157  (17%) 
 ($48,218) ($43,790) ($4,428) ($3,688)  ($740) 
 
                         
8 Of course, the wage differentials will be understated to the degree that discrimination influences the explained 
portion of the differential, and overstated to the degree that self-selection influences the unexplained portion of the 
differential (e.g., Darity, 1980). 
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5. Summary and Conclusions 
 
Using a unique set of data, we find that that a human-capital based model performs well in 
explaining salary differentials between men and women academic economists: salaries of both 
women and men tend to increase with levels of experience, the number of books and articles 
produced, and publication in top journals, while teaching more courses per year and working at a 
teaching oriented institution negatively affect salaries.  We find evidence of a salary hierarchy, with 
salaries increasing from liberal arts to comprehensive to research-doctoral schools.   
 Results provide additional support for the contention that male economists earn more than 
women economists, with an unexplained residual arising in all cases.  Though the data is limited, it 
uncovers a new perspective on how this gap differs across individual and institutional 
characteristics.  The gap is largest among more experienced individuals at research-oriented 
institutions and smallest among less experienced individuals at liberal arts and comprehensive 
institutions.  In addition to identifying systematic variations in the wage gap, the historical 
perspective will provide a useful benchmark for the literature and future research. 
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